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ABSTRACT:  
During the early 1970s, NATO member states such as Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands 
repeatedly sought to use the Atlantic Alliance as a forum to confront Portuguese domestic 
and colonial policies. However, the larger members of the organisation – including the USA, 
the UK, France and West Germany – successfully blocked their efforts. While the former 
expressed concern over the challenges posed by the Lisbon regime to NATO’s credibility at 
home and abroad, the latter sought to preserve their interests and institutional cohesion in 
view of the challenges posed by détente. This fault line reflected core differences in the 
allies’ perspectives about both Portugal and NATO itself. Drawing on extensive multi-
archival research, this article examines the motivations and actions of various member states 
on the North Atlantic Assembly and the NATO Council ministerial meetings. It reconsiders 
the international dimension of the Marcelo Caetano dictatorship and the connection between 
the Cold War framework and the process of Portuguese resistance to decolonisation in Africa. 
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Introduction 
In 1949, Portugal became one of the twelve original signatories of the North-Atlantic 
Treaty. The preamble of the treaty reaffirmed the NATO member states’ ‘faith in the 
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations’, as well their intention to 
‘safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the 
principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law’.1 The Alliance conveniently 
disregarded the contradiction between this preamble and the Estado Novo regime in place in 
Portugal, which was a direct remnant of Europe’s fascist era. Portugal’s geostrategic assets, 
most notably the Azores and Madeira archipelagos in mid-Atlantic, were deemed invaluable 
in a Cold War context.
2
 However, in the early 1970s the limits of NATO’s ties to Lisbon 
were put to the test. The main challenge was not the regime’s authoritarian nature – Portugal 
was no longer the only non-democratic member of the Alliance, as a military junta had taken 
power in Greece in 1967. Instead, increasing tension arose over the Portuguese dictatorship’s 
wars against liberation movements in the African colonies of Angola, Guinea-Bissau and 
Mozambique. This phase in the relations between Portugal and NATO, although immediately 
preceding the collapse of the Estado Novo through the Carnation Revolution of 25 April 
1974, remains under-researched.
3
 By analysing the final years of the Lisbon dictatorship, this 
article will challenge common narratives about the Estado Novo’s isolation and unbearable 
international pressure. It will demonstrate that despite growing distress within NATO over 
Portuguese policies, open confrontation was contained until the final stages of the 
dictatorship because for the most powerful members of the organisation the ongoing détente 
negotiations took priority over all other concerns. 
 Even without disregarding Portuguese agency in the revolutionary process that 
brought down the Estado Novo, there is a discernible international dimension associated with 
the dictatorship’s downfall. At the root of the military coup d’état which ushered the 
Carnation Revolution was the attrition caused by the guerrilla wars in Africa.
4
 During the 
final years of struggle, the liberation movements received support – in the form of logistical, 
military, financial and/or humanitarian aid – from independent African states,5 the Soviet 
Union
6
 and its Eastern European satellites,
7
 Yugoslavia,
8
 Cuba,
9
 China,
10
 the Scandinavian 
states
11
 and the Netherlands,
12
 as well as non-governmental anti-colonialist organisations.
13
 
Furthermore, by enabling – through the Azores airbase – the USA’s weapons airlift to Israel 
during the Middle East War of October 1973, Portugal became the target of a retaliatory Arab 
oil embargo which fuelled an energy crisis. This increased domestic inflation, economic 
uncertainty and, consequently, social unrest in early 1974.
14
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Nevertheless, putting too much emphasis on international hostility towards the Estado 
Novo can be misleading. According to António José Telo’s systemic theory, international 
dissonance was a fundamental cause of the Lisbon dictatorship’s breakdown. Telo argues that 
the prolonged resistance to decolonisation caused a significant rift between Portugal and its 
Western allies, acknowledging that in the case of France and West Germany such concerns 
only fully surfaced in the early 1970s, after they had already provided massive supplies of 
materiel to be used by the Portuguese armed forces in Africa.
15
 He concludes that the 1974 
regime change ultimately resulted from the ‘need to adjust the country to the evolution of the 
international system’.16 Despite proclamations of isolation, however, the reality was that in 
the final years of the Estado Novo Portugal was still a member of the United Nations (UN), 
fully integrated in the Western bloc, not only through NATO but through key multilateral 
institutions such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund 
and the European Free Trade Association, having also signed a trade agreement with the 
European Economic Community in July 1972.17 Therefore, the West’s actual position 
towards Lisbon requires further consideration. 
 
The background of confrontation 
 Disquiet over Portugal’s membership of the Atlantic Alliance dated at least as far 
back as the eruption of the Afro-Portuguese wars in the early 1960s. The Kennedy 
administration, having adopted a critical stance towards Lisbon’s refusal to decolonise, had 
considered tackling the issue through NATO. Washington was dissuaded by a combination of 
concerns over compromising ready access to the Azores airbase, lobbying by its French and 
British allies and the need to present a united Western front in face of the 1961 Berlin crisis.
18
 
Equally critical of the colonial wars, the Norwegian and Canadian governments had even 
briefly drafted proposals to expel Portugal from the organisation. To aggravate matters, the 
dictatorship’s unofficial use of NATO-designated equipment in Africa had prompted the 
Eastern and Afro-Asian blocs in the UN to accuse the Alliance of complicity with Portuguese 
colonialism.
19
 
 The beginning of the 1970s saw the allies engaging more and more with the matter of 
the Western bloc’s consistency on ethical issues. To some extent this can be explained by the 
political dynamics within specific member states. Pierre Trudeau’s governments in Canada 
adopted a strict interpretation of the Atlantic Alliance’s principles.20 In Italy, the Christian 
Democratic Party headed a government coalition (August 1970 - February 1972) including 
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liberals, social-democrats and, crucially, the Italian Socialist Party, which had only recently 
abandoned its anti-NATO stance.
21
 The left wing of the Italian Christian Democratic Party 
was likewise highly critical of a policy of passive acceptance of NATO’s positions.22 
Moreover, Danish politicians were particularly sensitive to accusations of support for 
Portugal’s refusal to decolonise – they carried a historical resentment over the domestic 
uproar in Denmark in 1952, when NATO had officially endorsed French resistance to 
decolonisation in Indochina.
23
 Denmark’s anti-militarist Radical Party scored one of its 
highest-ever electoral successes in 1968,
24
 joining a government coalition that – through its 
conservative-liberal foreign minister, Poul Hartling – openly criticised the Portuguese 
colonial wars in no uncertain terms.
25
  
By far the most vocal criticism of Lisbon’s colonialist designs came from the 
Norwegian Labour government and, later, from the Netherlands. Following a report from the 
Norwegian Committee on Foreign Affairs, in April 1971 the Oslo parliament (Storting) 
mandated the foreign minister, Andreas Zeier Cappelen, to raise objections to Portuguese 
colonialism within NATO. As Cappelen explained to the British ambassador in Oslo, the 
government would have proceeded even without the Storting’s recommendation. Cappelen, 
who had been tortured by Nazis during WWII, displayed a passionate commitment to human 
rights and conceived of NATO as more than a purely defensive alliance, stressing the 
importance that its members uphold international morality. The foreign minister also argued 
that in order to maintain public support for the organisation in Norway, every effort should be 
made for Lisbon to recognise the colonies’ right to self-determination.26 Oslo’s position was 
not atypical; although Norway consistently remained loyal to NATO’s main tenets, it had a 
tradition of voicing dissent over various Realpolitik issues, such as arms control and 
membership extension.
27
 The Dutch case represented a more radical departure. Throughout 
the 1960s, the official position of the Netherlands – itself a colonial power – had been far 
from critical of the Estado Novo. However, a strong anti-colonialist and anti-authoritarian 
social movement achieved a progressive impact on the agenda of the opposition labour party 
Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA), which during the election campaign of 1972 proposed to the 
government withdrawing from NATO altogether if Portugal still remained a member in four 
years time.
28
 The PvdA-led coalition government formed on 11 May 1973 publicly 
announced the intention of firmly challenging the Portuguese and Greek dictatorships 
through the Atlantic Alliance.
29
 
To a large degree, these politicians were reacting to public outrage in their countries 
against the war in Vietnam
30
 and to the challenge posed by the mobilisation of a new 
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generation which appeared to be less receptive to NATO’s aims.31 Post-May 1968, European 
youth was largely influenced by ‘third-worldism’, including a marked sensibility towards the 
devastating impact of Western colonialism in the Global South.
32
 Even domestic order was, 
arguably, at stake, as in the heated social upheaval of the times, causes such as the 
condemnation of the Estado Novo were accompanied by violent actions. In 1970 alone the 
Portuguese embassy in Brussels was repeatedly vandalised and petrol bombed. Similarly, 
bombs were thrown at the Belgian offices of the Portuguese airline TAP, which also received 
anonymous terrorist threats concerning its flights.
33
  
 Besides ideological and domestic considerations, geopolitics also encouraged a 
renewed impulse to confront Lisbon. A watershed event took place on the night of 22/23 
November 1970 when disguised Portuguese troops invaded Guinea-Conakry and attempted, 
unsuccessfully, to overthrow the Guinean president, Ahmed Sékou Touré, who was a 
declared supporter of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape 
Verde (PAIGC).
34
 Lisbon officially attributed the turmoil exclusively to dissidents of the 
Conakry regime and did not admit Portuguese involvement even to its allies.
35
 However, the 
Portuguese operation was publicly denounced by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), 
whose members also strongly condemned the dictatorship’s NATO allies at the UN.36 
Moreover, in response to the attack, Sékou Touré requested Soviet protection, allowing 
Moscow to send a naval task force to Guinea, in the middle of Africa’s Atlantic coast.37 The 
Portuguese invasion created an overwhelming backlash among the African bloc
38
 – which 
was an important and generally cohesive voting group in the UN
39
 – and it spread to the 
interior of the NATO Alliance. As Foreign Minister Cappelen acknowledged to the Storting 
in January 1972, publicly condemning Portugal was not just a way to put to pressure on the 
Estado Novo dictatorship to change its policies; it also served to convince the African states 
that NATO did not support the Portuguese actions in their continent.
40
  
Yet not all NATO members shared the urge to intervene against Portugal through the 
Atlantic Alliance, even when seriously affected by these circumstances. British policy-
makers, who were trying to bring down the white-minority government led by Ian Smith in 
Rhodesia since its unilateral declaration of independence in 1965, felt particularly frustrated 
with the Portuguese colonial authorities. Despite the UN-imposed economic sanctions on the 
Smith administration, the authorities in Mozambique had continued to allow Rhodesian 
commerce access to their Indian Ocean ports.
41 Moreover, in the aftermath of the Conakry 
invasion, the OAU focused the bulk of its criticism on the UK, the Federal Republic of 
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Germany (West Germany) and, to a lesser extent, the USA.
42
 The British foreign secretary, 
Sir Alec Douglas-Home, became worried about the possibility of similar ventures against 
other African governments harbouring anti-Portuguese guerrilla movements,
43
 including 
Commonwealth members Zambia
44
 and Tanzania.
45
 Of all the NATO allies, none suffered a 
harsher backlash than West Germany, whose embassy was accused by the Guinean 
authorities of having directly aided the Portuguese attack. Conakry expelled the local West 
German community and imprisoned two West German citizens before finally breaking off 
diplomatic relations with Bonn in January 1971.
46
 In West Germany, the coalition 
government headed by Willy Brandt faced intense protests against its country’s association 
with the Portuguese dictatorship, namely against the military cooperation between the two 
states
47
 and the participation of West German firms, backed by Bonn’s state credit 
guarantees, in the construction of the Cahora Bassa dam, in Mozambique.
48
 French 
companies were also involved in the Cahora Bassa project and while Paris did not face 
protests in the same scale as Bonn,
49
 it became a potential target for African criticism. 
Nevertheless, London, Bonn, Washington and Paris firmly rejected any discussion of 
Lisbon’s colonial policies in the context of NATO – and so did the organisation’s secretary-
generals during this period, Manlio Brosio and Joseph Luns. This attitude was based, to 
various degrees, on four sets of reasons, namely bilateral interests, multilateral strategic 
considerations, commitment to NATO cohesion and the prevalent reading of the situation in 
Portugal and Africa. 
 Firstly, the USA, the UK, France and West Germany had, historically, developed 
direct ties to the Estado Novo regime, including economic and military bilateral interests 
which a hostile stance towards Lisbon ran the risk of compromising. At an economic level, 
these four countries were Portugal’s main foreign trading partners. In the early 1970s, West 
Germany was the largest exporter to Portugal, totalling up to 14.4-15.7% of Portugal’s 
imports. It was followed by the UK (11.4-13.6% of Portuguese imports), the Portuguese 
colonies (10.1-13.2%), the USA (6.9-8.9%) and France (6.6-7%).
50
 French and West German 
firms remained committed to the Cahora Bassa project, unlike their Swedish and Italian 
partners.
51
 The leading foreign investors in Portugal were, respectively, the USA, 
multinational conglomerates and West Germany.
52
 
On a military level, both the American and West German air forces used bases in 
Portuguese territory under precarious conditions, making them reliant on the dictatorship’s 
goodwill. The Lajes airbase in the Azores was highly valuable for the United States, having 
played a key role in the Congo and Berlin crises of the early 1960s.
53
 In 1962, as a tactic to 
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counter the Kennedy administration’s pro-Africanist leanings, Lisbon had refused to renew 
the formal base agreement with the Americans. Although the Portuguese authorities 
continued to allow the USA to use the Lajes, the arrangement was now on a ‘day-to-day’ 
basis.
54
 By the end of the decade, improvement in US airlift capability and the adoption of 
‘prepositioning’ in NATO’s doctrine had reduced the American reliance on the Azores.55 
Nevertheless, the Nixon administration sought to stabilise the arrangement and reached an 
agreement with Lisbon in December 1971 to extend the USA’s rights in the Lajes until 
February 1974.
56
 The 1973 war in the Middle East then served as a reminder of the airbase’s 
value and of the Estado Novo’s reliability, as Portugal – unlike most European states – 
granted over-flight and landing rights to the USA’s airlift to Israel, albeit somewhat 
hesitantly.
57
 In the case of West Germany, in the early 1960s Bonn had invested over 140 
Million DM in the construction of a large base and adjacent residential neighbourhood near 
the Portuguese city of Beja, a project that West German media denounced as wasteful 
military megalomania.
58
 Set on taking advantage of the infrastructure which was already paid 
for, in May 1971 the Brandt government initiated an air force pilot training programme at the 
base. The programme relied heavily on a limited authorisation to use the Alcochete firing 
range, east of Lisbon, as well as on the dictatorship’s promise to build a new range near 
Beja.
59
 This dependency was only mitigated in August 1973, when Bonn, frustrated over the 
apparent Portuguese inability to provide the requested range, announced a significant 
reduction of its activities in the airbase.
60
 Although less steeped in controversy, since 1966 
the island of Flores, in the Azores, housed a French base which served as an observation post 
and tracking station for France’s ballistic experiments.61 
 Secondly, from a multilateral Cold War perspective, Portugal’s strategic potential, 
including that of its colonial possessions, remained appealing for the Atlantic Alliance.
62
 
While the Estado Novo was reluctant to commit major forces to the defence of central 
Europe, it took part in Atlantic defence through the Iberian Atlantic Command (IBERLANT). 
Its main contribution, however, was in the form of the possible usage of Portuguese ports, air 
and naval bases.
63
 With the increasing presence of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean Sea, 
it made sense for NATO to ensure the conditions for a rapid deployment in the European 
southwest.
64
 Furthermore, as detailed below, in 1972 Portugal’s Atlantic islands and African 
territories were included in NATO contingency planning.
65
 The Lisbon dictatorship was also 
perceived as one of the Alliance’s indirect links to Spain, which was bound to its neighbour 
by the 1939 Iberian Pact.
66
 Finally, because of Portugal’s geographic location, the country 
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represented – according to the political director of the West German Foreign Office – a 
‘bridge between the USA and Europe, in a psychological sense’.67 Consequently, rather than 
welcoming the expulsion of Portugal from the organisation, the general predisposition 
actually involved some concern that Lisbon might leave voluntarily. After the precedent of 
France’s withdrawal from the Military Command in 1966, the dictatorship seemed to be 
carefully – and vocally – weighing the advantages and disadvantages of replacing the 
Alliance with selective bilateral military understandings if NATO failed to provide enough 
support to sustain Portuguese interests in Africa.
68
 Even before taking over as secretary-
general, Joseph Luns declared publicly that ‘continued Portuguese membership [of ] NATO 
was vital in view [of the] deterioration [of the] international situation’ and that ‘NATO could 
not do without Portugal, while Portugal did not need NATO “equally badly”.’69 
 Thirdly, and more importantly, disrupting NATO’s relations with the Lisbon regime 
on the basis of its controversial status could open the door for a similar process regarding 
NATO’s other contested dictatorships, namely Greece and Turkey in the aftermath of the 
Turkish military coup of 12 March 1971. While Portugal’s strategic relevance was arguably 
tangential, the significance of the southeastern flank should not be underestimated. The 
Nixon Administration worried that Mediterranean instability could seriously endanger the 
détente with the USSR.
70
 Greece bordered three communist states and its NATO membership 
was considered an element of dissuasion against both a possible Soviet invasion of 
Yugoslavia and an attack on the Mediterranean front through Bulgaria. Turkey guarded the 
eastern access to the Mediterranean from the Black Sea and contributed 750,000 troops to the 
Atlantic Alliance. These two staunch NATO allies thus formed an essential barrier to Soviet 
expansion in the Balkans, North Africa and the Middle East. Moreover, their cooperation 
helped safeguard vital interests in Cyprus, including a relay station and a key NATO 
communication station which carried air defence and command material, as well as important 
British sovereign bases.
71
 Ironically, the Estado Novo, which in the early 1950s had opposed 
the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in the Alliance,
72
 ended up shielded by the notion that a 
backlash against Lisbon might spread to Athens and Ankara. This was not a farfetched 
possibility: in fact, since as far back as 1967 Washington and London had been leading 
diplomatic efforts to prevent the Danish, Norwegian and Dutch governments from seeking 
the suspension from NATO of the Greek regime of the Colonels.
73
 
 The dangers of an escalation in internal debate over the NATO dictatorships exceeded 
the direct strategic implications of alienating or losing specific members of the organisation. 
For the central powers and the secretary-generals such a debate was, at best, a distraction 
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from the priority of discussing détente initiatives – such as the Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks (SALT), the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) and the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) – and at worst, a threat to the Alliance’s 
cohesion, which was still recovering from the French partial withdrawal. Both Brosio and 
Luns were adamant that Cold War priorities should retain precedence over discussion about 
the dictatorships and proved willing to use elaborate tactics to contain intra-Alliance 
dispute.
74
 Allied foreign ministries took for granted that NATO had ‘enough problems 
already’75 and that, by paving the way for sanctions on other members, a Portuguese 
precedent could compromise not only the stability of the Alliance but its very existence.
76
 In 
the case of West Germany, this concern was coupled with the perceived need to demonstrate 
loyalty to the major Western powers in order to discredit fears of a West German pull 
towards neutralism due to Bonn’s then-policy of independent rapprochement with Eastern 
Europe (neue Ostpolitik). Furthermore, the Brandt government’s political leeway was limited 
by the fact that the notion of reaching out to authoritarian regimes was at the very core of 
neue Ostpolitik. Significantly, an aggressive approach towards the Estado Novo on the basis 
of the oppression of Africans could risk undermining West Germany’s case for improving 
relations with its neighbouring state, East Germany, traditionally portrayed by Bonn as a 
ruthless oppressor of Germans.
77
 
 Lastly, a thorough understanding of the attitude displayed by Lisbon’s allies needs to 
take into account their readings of the Portuguese context. In September 1968, Marcelo 
Caetano had replaced the Estado Novo’s founding leader, António de Oliveira Salazar, after 
the latter had suffered a debilitating stroke. Caetano, who had historically advocated a 
reformist approach to the regime, including on the colonial front, inspired benevolent 
expectations in the British
78
 and West German
79
 diplomats. The new leader initially promoted 
relative economic and – to a lesser extent – political liberalisation, although he did not 
effectively part with the regime’s authoritarian structure and ideology. Faced with resistance 
by the powerful ultraconservative right (the ‘ultras’), disappointment from the parliamentary 
‘liberal wing’ and protests by the persecuted leftist opposition, from late 1970 on Caetano 
gradually withdrew his most progressive initiatives and ushered in a renewed wave of 
repression.
80
 Nevertheless, even while growing disillusioned with the Portuguese leader, both 
Edward Heath’s conservative government in the UK and Willy Brandt’s social-liberal 
coalition in West Germany continued to view Caetano as the only chance for peaceful change 
in the colonies. They were convinced that international goodwill could empower both 
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Caetano and the most Europe-oriented faction of the regime, thus encouraging further reform 
or, at least, keeping the Africa-oriented ‘ultras’ from taking over completely.81 
More than the prospect of domestic evolution, it was the outlook on the colonial 
question which decisively contributed to the leniency evinced towards the Estado Novo. 
There was no clear consensus over how to deal with Portugal within each government, or 
even within each foreign office.
82
 Yet the positions adopted regarding the discussion of 
Portuguese colonialism within NATO reflected a set of general attitudes by Lisbon’s allies, 
even if they did not represent the whole of these states’ policy towards the Estado Novo. 
Although the foreign offices in London and Bonn favoured African independence, they 
insisted that Lisbon should manage decolonisation without being pushed and that this should 
be a gradual process in order to avoid a repeat of the Congo crisis of 1960-5. Moreover, each 
feared that an abrupt Portuguese withdrawal might spur either white-supremacist regimes, 
like Rhodesia, or anti-Western states led by Marxist-influenced liberation movements.
83
 In 
Washington, the Nixon administration embraced the pragmatic – yet questionable – 
assumption that Portuguese dominance of the colonies was a stabilising force in the region 
and that it was bound to continue for the foreseeable future.
84
 Paris also adopted a position of 
resignation. Although the French president, Georges Pompidou, recognised in the Lisbon 
dictatorship the hubris that had damned France in the Algerian war, he also seemed to accept 
that little could be done to dissuade a colonial power from holding on to its waning empire.
85
 
Secretary-General Joseph Luns was a more extreme case. The conservative Luns – who 
served as Dutch foreign minister from 1952 until July 1971 – was notoriously sympathetic 
towards the Estado Novo, having even been awarded the Portuguese Order of Christ 
distinction in 1968.
86
 He advocated NATO’s closer ties with Lisbon and justified this by 
telling the press, a month before taking over as secretary-general, that ‘Portugal sheds its 
blood for our freedom’, thus siding with the Portuguese argument that the colonial wars were 
being fought to prevent communist expansion.
87
 Luns became a popular target for activists in 
the Netherlands, where a 1971 poster had him smilingly referring to Portugal’s contribution 
to African civilisation under the bloody figure of a gunned down freedom fighter.
88
 
 
The Portuguese question in the lower fora 
In practice, from 1970 on, the conflicting approaches towards the Caetano 
dictatorship found clear expression in different fora of NATO. Before examining the highest 
profile level, the NATO Council, one should consider the political atmosphere in the 
structure surrounding the North Atlantic Assembly, the Alliance’s largest consultative forum. 
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Moving up the organisation’s hierarchy, references to the Portuguese situation can be found 
in expert working groups, in the policy committees that proposed the Alliance’s overall 
strategic goals and, finally, in the North Atlantic Assembly itself, which was tasked with 
approving those goals before they went to the NATO Council. 
The reports of the Expert Working Group on Africa – set up to assess, primarily, 
Communist penetration in that continent
89
 – showed a balance between concessions to the 
Portuguese line and to Lisbon’s critics. The latter managed to include a passage justifying 
Western non-military support to the liberation movements on the pretext of lessening those 
movements’ dependence on – and gratitude towards – the Soviet Bloc.90 The diplomatic and 
strategic damage caused by the 1970 attack on Conakry was highlighted, with the report’s 
text objectively pointing out that a UN Security Council mission had accepted the charges of 
Portugal’s involvement and that this accusation had been formally denied by Lisbon.91 The 
reports left out some of the most cynical interpretations of the Portuguese delegation, such as 
the notion that African ‘unity is basically verbal, a rigmarole involving attacks to 
colonialism, racism, imperialism and neo-colonialism, to which the African leaders more and 
more insistently resort as a way to deviate attention from their countries[’] acute racial, 
tribal, economic, social and political problems’.92 By contrast, clear Portuguese contributions 
to the reports can be read in the recurrent references to Caetano’s ongoing administrative 
reforms, as well as to the increasing economic development, social progress and absence of 
racial discrimination in the Portuguese territories. On a more subtle level, since 1972 the 
liberation movements were referred to as ‘liberation’ movements, with the inverted commas 
implicitly questioning their agenda.
93
 
Ultimately, the main positions of the Expert Working Group on Africa towards the 
Estado Novo fell into line with the stance of Lisbon’s closest allies. Without validating 
Portugal’s actions, the Group nonetheless prioritised allied solidarity when faced with 
African pressure to remove support for the Caetano regime. It recommended that NATO 
members ‘should make clear to African governments that while they sympathise with the 
aim of self-determination, they cannot, where their own essential national interests are 
involved, be expected to defer to the particularised view points of those African 
governments.’94 Calling for pragmatism, the Group condemned independent African states 
for endorsing the use of force by the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies, as 
well as in South Africa and Rhodesia: 
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‘Change in Southern Africa cannot in the view of the Experts be expected to come 
quickly. The balance of forces as they exist today does not suggest that outside 
force can be expected rapidly to promote change. For the time being, the existence 
of white minority regimes must be accepted as a fact. [...] The dangers of espousing 
violent means to secure change are clear to the Expert Group. It is to be hoped that 
African Governments too can be persuaded to see those dangers.’95 
 
The line between leniency and support was not always easy to determine, even 
among Lisbon’s key partners. In April 1971, the West German government sought to defuse 
its image of an ‘immoral’ arms dealer by multilateralising military sales through NATO. 
Bonn sounded out a few close allies about establishing a programme to provide joint military 
assistance to Portugal, as well as to Greece and Turkey. As explained by Chancellor Brandt, 
in order to avoid opposition on political grounds from the Danish and Norwegian 
governments, the programme could be implemented at the level of the Defence and Security 
Committee rather than the NATO Council, presumably because the former was more 
military-focused and less politically-driven.
96
 According to a British diplomat, while the 
American secretary of defense, Melvin Laird, approved the idea with ‘enthusiastic noises’, 
the reaction of the Italian prime minister, Emilio Colombo, was ‘cool and sceptical’. The 
British prime minister rejected the plan, which thus fell through. London did not wish to risk 
agitating the Scandinavians any more than it wished to agitate the Portuguese.
97
 
The British, however, did contribute decisively to one of Lisbon’s main victories 
during this period, namely that of seeing its colonial territories recognised as beneficial by 
the Alliance. A British delegate, Patrick Wall – known for his benevolent views on 
Portuguese colonialism
98
 – proposed that the UK and Portugal take the lead in safeguarding 
NATO interests in the face of Soviet expansion in the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean.
99
 In 
September 1971, Wall founded the Sub-Committee on the Soviet Maritime Threat, soon 
joined by a Portuguese general, Luís Maria da Câmara Pino.
100
 This sub-committee 
dismissed the Alliance’s traditional reluctance to operate south of the Tropic of Cancer (i.e., 
outside of the area covered by the North-Atlantic Treaty) by claiming that ‘democracies – by 
their very nature – are not easily moved to strengthen their defence posture’.101 The sub-
committee’s report, presented to the North Atlantic Assembly, argued that if the Soviet navy 
cut off the Mediterranean oil supply routes to the West, it would be necessary to protect 
alternative oil shipments travelling from the Persian Gulf around the Cape of Good Hope 
towards Europe. To this effect, Portugal ‘would be able to provide facilities in the Azores, 
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the Cape Verde Islands, Madeira and Sao Tomé, together with facilities on the African 
mainland, to help in assuming the protection of the Cape Route’.102 Despite the Dutch 
delegation’s stringent opposition to the report, the proposal was adopted by 14 votes to 12, in 
November 1972.
103
 It drew particular criticism in the increasingly anti-colonialist 
Netherlands, where critics objected to any collaboration with South Africa or the Portuguese 
colonies that could be perceived as political support.
104
   
 While the Dutch were not the only delegates to condemn the Estado Novo in the 
North Atlantic Assembly, they were the most forceful in pushing for an explicit 
denunciation. When the assembly convened in Ottawa in September 1971, the Canadian 
secretary of state for external affairs, Mitchell Sharp, opened the inaugural session by 
praising the significance of representative democracies. Keeping a tactful tone, Sharp pointed 
out that public acceptance of NATO within its member nations was ‘threatened when 
member governments fail to live up to certain minimum standards in the conduct of their 
affairs, whether this be by abrogation of the democratic process, by adherence to a colonial 
policy or otherwise.’ The subsequent discussion on this topic, however, focused exclusively 
on the Greek regime, except for a brief reference to Portugal by the Dutch delegate Max van 
der Stoel,
105
 a parliamentarian from the PvdA who had already made a name for himself as 
the Council of Europe’s rapporteur on human rights abuses in Greece.106 The following year, 
van der Stoel wrote in the first draft of the Political Committee’s report a blunt reproach of 
NATO’s accommodating attitude towards the Lisbon regime: 
 
‘As yet, NATO does not seem to appreciate the repugnance with which many 
people within its member countries, particularly in the democratic left, regard the 
situation in Greece and Portugal and the wars in Angola and Mozambique. [...] 
When governments set the lead in international cooperation we cannot expect the 
young to remain silent if they see things which they dislike happening in another 
member country of the Alliance. Your Rapporteur is not advocating a form of 
Western “Brezhnev doctrine”. Far from it. He is merely stressing that self-
determination, free elections and the rule of law should be the governing principles 
of all our member states. [...] The Alliance cannot survive unless it is based on the 
voluntary acceptance of it by the peoples of its member states. It should be 
remembered that those who feel most strongly about these issues, the young, will 
be the political leaders of tomorrow.’ 107 
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Unsurprisingly, the strongest worded reaction to this document came from the 
Portuguese representative at the Political Committee, Alberto Franco Nogueira, who had 
been the Estado Novo’s foreign minister from 1961 to 1969 and was now one of the key 
voices of the Salazarist ‘ultras’. True to Lisbon’s official rhetoric, Nogueira claimed that it 
was inaccurate to speak of ‘wars’ in Angola and Mozambique – rather than counter-
insurgency operations – and that the political systems of different allied countries were the 
business of those countries alone. While accepting the point about Portugal’s role in NATO’s 
image problem among young people, American, British and German delegates convinced 
van der Stoel to tone down the language in the cited passages.
108
 Regardless, the author of 
the political report of autumn 1973, the Dutch Peter Dankert, was even more vehement in his 
assessment. Arguing that in an age of détente NATO could no longer justify its existence to 
the general public solely on military grounds, Dankert highlighted the frequent public 
criticism based on the hypocritical ‘paradox of attacking the Soviet Union for its repressive 
policies whilst within the Alliance there are countries who deny liberty of expression, burn 
books and practice imprisonment without trial.’ Although once again the main target was 
Greece, the Estado Novo did not come off unscathed: 
 
‘In the case of Portugal the report of the [Wiriyamu] massacres in Mozambique 
was a further blow to the public image of NATO. [...] Developing countries in 
Africa and elsewhere, in and outside the United Nations continuously attack 
Portuguese colonialism. These attacks increasingly imply that NATO or at least 
NATO countries by delivering arms enable Portugal, a small country, to continue 
its colonial policies. Further they fail to use their influence to persuade Portugal to 
respect the fundamental principles the Alliance declares it stands for. 
[...] Your Rapporteur feels that the reports about massacres in Mozambique would 
justify pressure on Portugal to accept an investigation by an independent group of 
experts, parliamentarians or others, to establish whether there is any truth in 
allegations concerning atrocities committed by an allied country in its overseas 
provinces. NATO, in the eyes of public opinion, has a price to pay for Portuguese 
membership. The logical consequence would be for Portugal to pay a price also.’109 
 
This report, together with Dankert’s draft resolution on human rights – which 
included a plea to the Council ‘to use its influence on Portugal to recognise the right to self-
determination for its African colonies’110 – was to generate Lisbon’s most comprehensive 
response. In the Political Committee, the Portuguese delegation accused Dankert of trying to 
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make Portugal a scapegoat for the public attitude towards NATO while ignoring the impact 
of enemy propaganda. The Portuguese claimed that the massacre reports were false, based on 
unproven evidence and spread by communists and African countries moved by ‘racial 
hatred’ against Lisbon’s ‘legitimate attempt to create a multiracial community’. Somewhat 
inconsistently, the delegation also stated that ‘if the reports were true, there were no wars 
where massacres did not take place’, adding that by Dankert’s logic, one could say ‘that the 
activities of the Americans at My Lai or those of the British in Northern Ireland [likewise] 
sullied the Alliance.’111 In the assembly, the Portuguese representative recalled Portugal’s 
strategic contributions to NATO and defended the Estado Novo’s African policies. He also 
turned the hypocrisy argument on its head by criticising those who, in the name of détente, 
seemed unwilling to denounce atrocities in the Eastern Bloc yet found it ‘much easier to 
attack Portugal, a small country without great influence in international affairs.’112 
The October 1973 debates in the Political Committee and in the North Atlantic 
Assembly engaged with the Portuguese issue to an unusual extent, even if the topic did not 
dominate discussions. The views expressed in Dankert’s report were endorsed by delegates 
from the Netherlands and Norway. Because interventions were determined by personal 
politics and not just national interests, Dankert was also supported by two members of the 
West German delegation.
113
 Moreover, a Dane and two Dutch delegates proposed a further 
resolution specifically about the Portuguese overseas territories, urging Lisbon ‘to grant the 
peoples of Angola, Guinea-Bissao [sic] and Mozambique the right of self-determination in a 
peaceful way.’114 By contrast, a third member of the German delegation stated that the 
‘Assembly was not competent to deal with the problems of [the Portuguese colonies] because 
its terms of reference did not extend beyond the North Atlantic area.’ Arguing that in any 
case ‘the deviation from what other member countries considered full democratic 
government had existed in Portugal before the Alliance had been formed’, he quipped that ‘a 
wife or an ally should be accepted as they were unless new developments intervened.’ 
Shortly afterwards, a Belgian delegate added that it was a mistake not to recognise ‘that 
public opinion was always indifferent to military institutions during peace time’ and that 
such ‘indifference would not be reduced if new policies were carried out in Portugal and 
Greece.’115  
In the end, the Dutch initiatives were undermined by majority rule. The text of 
Dankert’s resolution on human rights was revised to remove direct references to specific 
member countries. It now obliquely asked the Council ‘to urge member governments that 
they make every endeavour to ensure that they maintain the principles for which the Alliance 
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stands’ and ‘to use its influence to promote a speedier and continuing process of self-
determination for such dependent territories as the members of the organisation may still 
have.’116 As for the resolution on the Portuguese overseas territories, it was voted down and 
did not even make it to the North Atlantic Assembly.
117
 
 
The Portuguese question in the Council ministerial meetings 
In terms of powerful actors and public visibility, the most relevant stage of 
confrontation was NATO’s biannual Council meetings of foreign ministers – the ‘autumn 
meetings’ in Brussels and the ‘spring meetings’ in rotating cities. In late 1970, NATO 
Secretary-General Manlio Brosio and the Portuguese authorities agreed to hold the following 
‘spring meeting’ in Lisbon, prompting Canadian and Italian diplomats to lobby to change the 
venue.
118
 By the time the Alliance’s ministers gathered in Brussels, on 3-4 December 1970, 
the UN Security Council was assessing the Portuguese involvement in the Conakry 
invasion
119
 and it became even harder to overlook the implications of the proposed location 
of the meeting in spring. On the first day of the autumn gathering, the Belgian foreign 
minister, concerned about a domestic political backlash, hinted gently at the questionable 
appropriateness of assembling in Portugal. The point was forcefully taken up by his 
Canadian colleague, backed up by the Danish and Norwegian ministers, generating a vivid 
discussion. That evening, Brosio arranged a conciliatory dinner with the most exercised 
participants, namely the ministers from Portugal, Canada, Denmark, the USA, West 
Germany and France. The Turkish foreign minister was also present since the Canadian and 
Danish ministers sought to move the ‘spring meeting’ to (pre-coup) Ankara. They met again 
the following morning and the Portuguese foreign minister, Rui Patrício, insisted on keeping 
the original venue. He argued that what was at stake was not the Portuguese African policy, 
but NATO’s willingness to cave in to external pressure. According to Patrício, there would 
always be controversies – today the Portuguese dictatorship, tomorrow the Greek – and 
showing weakness and lack of cohesion could destroy the Alliance. This position was firmly 
endorsed by the American secretary of state, William Rogers, and by NATO’s secretary-
general, who managed to persuade most of the others. Thus, at a reunion dedicated to SALT 
and MBFR, the NATO delegates ended up spending much of the time debating the city of 
the next meeting, only to finally stick with the initial location.
120
 
While the two camps seemed well-defined, the size of the dispute was not yet clear. 
After the December meeting, the Italian foreign minister, Aldo Moro, seemingly anxious 
over his chances in Italy’s presidential elections, confessed to Brosio uneasiness over the 
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decision to hold the upcoming event in Lisbon. Brosio secretly passed this information along 
to the USA’s permanent representative to NATO, Robert Ellsworth, who shared it with his 
British counterpart. American and British diplomats agreed to look out for and, if necessary, 
counteract any moves to switch the meeting away from the Portuguese capital.
121
 In March 
1971, Ellsworth approached Brosio with indications of Italian, Danish, Norwegian and 
Canadian opposition to the Lisbon venue and consulted with him over possible tactics to 
head off confrontation on this matter.
122
 Although Washington was soon able to obtain 
reassurances that none of the allies was actually considering a boycott of the meeting,
123
 
tension increased once again after the Storting urged, on 22 April, Norwegian Foreign 
Minister Andreas Cappelen to address the issue of Portugal’s colonial policy at the event.124 
The Portuguese privately let their closest allies know that if Cappelen forced a debate on this 
issue and the majority took his side, they would feel obliged to call for an immediate 
suspension of the meeting.
125
 Over the following weeks, Cappelen was pressed not to go 
ahead with the speech by American, British, French, German and Portuguese diplomats, as 
well as by secretary-general Brosio.
126
 Because the Norwegian minister did not appear 
deterred, two weeks before the meeting London engaged in a series of backstage demarches 
to dissuade the other members from supporting Cappelen at the Council table. London also 
investigated the rumour that the Dane Poul Hartling was planning a statement against the 
Greek dictatorship.
127
 
 At the meeting itself, which took place on 3-4 June 1971, the confrontation was a 
lively yet minor episode. Without naming specific countries, Hartling’s intervention argued 
that in order to ensure popular support for NATO, its members should uphold the ideals of 
the preamble to the North-Atlantic Treaty, including the principles of democracy and self-
determination.
128
 Cappelen made a similar point at the end of his speech, but in more 
concrete terms. Co-opting key expressions typically used to shield the NATO dictatorships 
from criticism – ‘cohesion’, ‘solidarity’ – he stressed that the Alliance’s ‘common security 
and cohesion’ depended on the sense of ‘solidarity’ generated by the ‘political and moral 
strength’ of individual members. Cappelen went on to lament that no meaningful progress 
had been made regarding ‘the restoration of democracy and human rights’ in Greece, before 
focusing at length on the Portuguese case: 
 
‘It will be well known to this Council that my Government feels that the 
policies pursued by the Government of Portugal with regard to the territories of 
Guinea, Angola and Mozambique are not in conformity with the principles and 
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purposes of the UN Charter. The same view was recently expressed by 
representatives of all the political parties in Norway during a debate in our 
Parliament [...] We feel that the Portuguese policy in this matter is undermining 
support for NATO in our own countries and is hurting NATO's image in Africa as 
well as in other parts of the world because in the public mind, NATO itself is 
increasingly being associated with this policy. We are fully aware that the 
Government of Portugal holds the view that this matter falls within Portuguese 
domestic jurisdiction. Neither we nor the great majority of UN members can accept 
this view. 
[...] It is, Mr. Chairman, against this background and in the light of the basic 
principles which the North Atlantic Treaty stands for, that I appeal to our 
Portuguese Ally to reconsider its present policies in Africa.’129 
 
 The Portuguese reply was predictably feisty. Foreign Minister Patrício accused the 
Norwegian minister of ignorance of the issue and of echoing ‘a campaign directed against 
Portugal by its worse enemies, who are also [the worse enemies] of the West’, thus playing 
into the communists’ hands. He further criticised Cappelen for ‘hurting the deepest feelings 
of the Portuguese people’, upsetting the working order of the Council meeting and 
undermining the key principle of solidarity within the Alliance. Patrício finished by mocking 
the Norwegian government for thinking that Portugal, after 10 years of determined struggle, 
would change its policy ‘with the sole purpose of satisfying the impertinent resolutions 
approved by the Oslo parliament.’ Except for the Greek delegate, who defended the honour 
of ‘démocratie à la grecque’, none of the ministers prolonged the discussion over this matter. 
Manlio Brosio, however, briefly reprimanded the Scandinavians at the end of the meeting, 
concluding: ‘I hope that the discussion which took place tonight will show how useless, 
futile and, I think, dangerous for the Alliance it is to allow this discussion to repeat itself. If 
we undermine our solidarity we run the risk of undermining the substance of our Alliance 
and in such a case it would be of little avail to try to save its image.’130 
 Not only did Norway’s effort fail to mobilise other allies, it was also unsuccessful as 
a public stunt to save NATO’s face. No reference was made to the Portugal discussion in the 
meeting’s press conference.131 Norwegian media did report on the incident extensively, but 
emphasised the shortcomings of Cappelen’s action.132 The Portuguese press left out 
Cappelen’s intervention while fully transcribing Patrício’s response – thus creating a 
puzzling narrative, according to the French ambassador – as well as Marcelo Caetano’s 
speech at the opening session.
133
 Moreover, the Alliance’s association with the Portuguese 
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wars was reasserted by outside critics. The OAU and the African liberation movements 
expressed indignation over the choice of the Lisbon venue, considering it a sign of NATO’s 
endorsement of Portugal’s activities in Africa.134 During the meeting itself, a Portuguese 
resistance group against the Estado Novo – Armed Revolutionary Action (ARA) – sought to 
disrupt the conference by bombing telegraph and telephone offices in Lisbon, as well as a 
power station in the suburb of Sacavém. As a result of the former, communications at 
NATO’s press centre were cut off for a few hours.135  
 Besides the respectability it granted Portugal as a host, the Lisbon meeting set a 
lasting precedent against Council discussion over Portuguese colonial politics. The isolation 
of Norway’s interventionist approach was reinforced during the 1971 ‘autumn meeting’, in 
Brussels (9-10 December). At that meeting, when the new Danish foreign minister, K.B. 
Andersen, drew attention to a resolution of the North Atlantic Assembly about the lack of 
democratic principles in Greece, Cappelen supported him and briefly added that Oslo’s 
views on Lisbon’s African policies were also well known.136 Once again, only the Greek and 
Portuguese delegates reacted to Cappelen’s remark.137 In 1972, taking advantage of West 
Germany’s status as host of the ‘spring meeting’, West German diplomats were able to 
persuade their Scandinavian neighbours not to mention the colonial question at the Bonn 
event.
138
 By the ‘autumn meeting’ of 6-7 December 1972, neither Cappelen’s more cautious 
successor in the Oslo Foreign Office nor his Danish counterpart proved willing to raise the 
issue of Portugal, or even Greece.
139
 The general atmosphere had become one of resignation.
 
Contemporary scholarly analysis confidently described NATO-Portuguese relations as 
clearly stabilised, concluding
 
that if ‘Norway and Denmark are still officially questioning 
Portugal’s Africa policies, the other NATO members seem to have abandoned such a 
course’.140 While in office, Cappelen told the British ambassador that, despite the 
disapproval Oslo had faced from other allies over its tactics, he took consolation in the fact 
that at least the African resolutions in the UN were no longer attacking NATO as such for 
supporting Portuguese colonialism – the latest resolutions referred only to ‘some members of 
NATO’.141 
 The activist camp gained a vigorous new ally with the PvdA’s victory in the 1973 
Dutch elections, when Max van der Stoel became foreign minister in the ensuing coalition 
government. A strong believer in the Atlantic Alliance – earning him some criticism from his 
party’s left wing142 – van der Stoel immediately vowed to use NATO to act against the 
Lisbon regime.
143
 He took his first tentative steps at the ‘spring meeting’, in Copenhagen (14-
15 June), much to the frustration of Secretary-General Joseph Luns.
144
 At the Council table, 
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van der Stoel’s intervention was restrained, arguing in abstract terms that if in the CSCE the 
West was to sincerely demand from the East a greater respect for freedom, than it was 
important for the Alliance members to ‘practice what we preach’. The Dutch minister also 
invoked the point about public opinion which he had previously presented in the North 
Atlantic Assembly.
145
 At this stage, however, van der Stoel preferred to voice his more 
specific criticism in private talks with the Greek and Portuguese foreign ministers, 
respectively.
146
 Indeed, according to the American report on the Council meeting, despite 
earlier concerns that Athens and Lisbon would prove a topic of divisive debate, ‘there 
appeared to be an understanding among the Benelux countries’ about keeping related 
interventions low-key so as not to disrupt the proceedings.
147
 Nevertheless, the renewed 
momentum of interventionism did not go unnoticed. When Washington expressed the wish to 
hold a NATO summit during the US president’s visit to Europe in late 1973, the political 
director of the West German Foreign Office advised the Americans against the idea, warning 
that the Dutch and the Scandinavians might oppose the attendance of the Portuguese and 
Greek leaders.
148
 When van der Stoel visited the UK on 27 June, the British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office made sure to prepare a defence against possible Dutch lobbying: 
 
‘We [the British Government] have made it clear to the Greek Government both in 
public and private that we should welcome the restoration of democratic processes 
there. We do not speak similarly to or about the Portuguese Government. If Mr. 
van der Stoel asks why not, the reply might be that Portugal was accepted as a 
fellow member of NATO in the full knowledge that it was not a democracy; the 
same is not true of Greece. 
[...] NATO is not, in our view, an appropriate forum to discuss either Portugal’s 
internal affairs or her African policies; such discussion would be most offensive to 
the Portuguese and threaten the cohesion of the Alliance.’149 
 
 The ‘autumn meeting’ of 9-10 December 1973 – the last ministerial Council meeting 
before the fall of the Estado Novo – had the potential to generate the most acerbic 
confrontation about the Caetano dictatorship. On the one hand, with the Labour Party’s return 
to power in Oslo in October 1973, for once all three of the main adversaries of Lisbon within 
NATO – Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands – had simultaneous left/centre-left 
governments with a strong human rights agenda. On the other hand, the impending CSCE had 
reinvigorated the discourse about solidarity among the allies in order to keep a united front at 
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the negotiations with the Eastern bloc. In the end, the Athens Polytechnic uprising against the 
regime of the Colonels, violently repressed by the Greek authorities on 17 November, firmly 
stole the spotlight away from the Estado Novo. Under the pretext of drafting an idealist 
Declaration on Atlantic Relations for NATO’s 25th anniversary, the Scandinavian and Dutch 
ministers made lengthy speeches at the Council, revisiting their traditional arguments against 
undemocratic regimes within the Alliance. Yet their interventions were explicitly directed at 
Greece, with not a single direct reference to either Portugal or colonialism.
150
 
 
Conclusion 
In the early 1970s, the unpopularity of the Portuguese dictatorship in the Third World 
and sectors of Western public opinion instigated occasional attempts to confront Lisbon’s 
policies in various NATO fora. Interventionism was most prominently championed by 
delegates from Norwegian, Danish and Dutch governments. Their critique focused mostly on 
Portugal’s colonial dimension, reflecting the notoriety of the Estado Novo’s wars in Africa 
and the lesser exposure of its repressive practices at home, especially in contrast with the 
more recent and internationally vilified regime of the Colonels in Greece. Interventionists 
defended a moral conception of NATO, which they regarded as more than a pragmatic 
military alliance. They invoked the ethical imperative of using the organisation’s soft power 
to press for a change in Portuguese policy as well as a more practical concern with redeeming 
NATO’s public image of guilt by association. However, due to difficulties in imposing this 
topic of debate within the Alliance, particularly at the highest levels, initiatives did not go 
beyond admonishment – often through indirect allusions – and into substantive discussion of 
tangible disciplinary measures. Lacking support for their cause from the other allies, not even 
Lisbon’s staunchest critics proved willing to effectively compromise NATO’s workings in 
the name of fighting Portuguese colonialism, especially at a time of sensitive negotiations 
about détente. Thus, even at the peak of intra-Alliance confrontation, the Estado Novo did not 
face serious institutional pressure. 
The main agents of resistance to interventionism were Washington, London, Paris and 
Bonn, as well as the Alliance’s secretary-generals. These actors cited the principles of allied 
solidarity and non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states. On a more concrete 
level, they called attention to Portugal’s strategic importance in responding to the Soviet 
naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea as well as to the perceived dangers of infighting for 
the ongoing diplomatic dialogue with the Eastern bloc. Crucially, discussion over the 
Portuguese dictatorship, it was feared, would lead the way for further discussion over Greek 
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and Turkish authoritarian rule. Displaying a different perspective on NATO than that of the 
interventionists, the organisation’s core powers argued that undermining a member state 
could be a more damaging blow to the Alliance’s cohesion than the resentment such state 
might inspire in fellow members and their constituencies. To a certain degree, this fault line 
can be seen as reflecting the fact that, except for West Germany, these states had conservative 
governments consistently throughout this period, unlike the interventionists. As these were 
the Estado Novo’s closest allies, their position can also be traced back to bilateral relations 
and to a more accommodating attitude towards the Portuguese regime. In any case, as this 
article has argued, the disagreement did not stem exclusively from the conflict of realist 
interests, but also from ideological considerations and diverging perspectives, including the 
benevolent expectations generated by Marcelo Caetano’s reformist rhetoric among some of 
Lisbon’s key allies. 
Ultimately, despite the Estado Novo’s controversial status in its final years, it 
continued to benefit from a generally accepting international framework. Safeguarded by the 
organisation’s most powerful members, the Caetano dictatorship remained firmly integrated 
in NATO, which may speak less for the sophistication of Portuguese diplomacy than for the 
leverage of its well-placed allies and the encompassing shadow of Cold War geopolitics. 
While Portugal may have been misaligned in the historical narrative of decolonisation, it was 
intrinsically aligned with Western dynamics through the very fact that it was a founding 
member of the Atlantic Alliance. This membership deemed discussion of Portuguese policies 
a challenge to NATO’s focus and the marginalisation of the Portuguese regime a threat to 
NATO’s unity. Therefore, rather than a strain on the Estado Novo, NATO served as a 
reminder that Lisbon’s main allies were not just willing to tolerate the Portuguese 
dictatorship, they were ready to protect it from major external interference.  
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